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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a small claims action originating in the Ogden City
Justice Court and heard de novo in the Second Judicial District Court of Weber
County. Appellate jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to reviewing rulings on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. Utah Code Ann. §78A-8-106(2) (West
2009). This Court has jurisdiction over this case by virtue of the fact that the case
has been transferred to it by the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)0) (West 2009).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue #1: Whether a requirement that a fee be paid in order to obtain a
hearing challenging a notice that a person has violated municipal property
maintenance standards and is subject to a potential civil penalty violates the
constitutional rights of an accused person to not be compelled to advance a fee
prior to final judgment under Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
Standard of Review: This is a constitutional issue that is reviewed for
correctness. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f25, 100 P.3d 1177, 1185.
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was raised by oral motion and ruled on
by the trial court during the trial. Trial Transcript, pp. 64-66; 71-72.

Issue #2: Whether the assessment of civil fines by a municipality for the
violation of municipal property maintenance standards is in direct conflict with
Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code, which outlines the procedure by which
cities may recover costs they incur in the abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse and
deleterious objects or structures on private property.
Standard of Review: This is a constitutional issue that is reviewed for
correctness. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, | 2 5 , 100 P.3d 1177, 1185, see also Salt
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Lake City v. Newman, 2006 UT 69, \ 10, 148 P.3d 931 (ordinance which impliedly
conflicts with state statute not unconstitutional).
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was raised by oral motion and ruled on
by the trial court during the trial. Trial Transcript, pp. 44-46; 49-51; 67-69.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND RULES

Utah Constitution Article I, Section 12:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf,
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination,
the function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable
cause exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by
statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by
statute or rule.
3
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Utah Code, Title 10, Chapter 3, Section 703:
(1) The governing body of each municipality may impose a minimum
criminal penalty for the violation of any municipal ordinance by a fine not to
exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine under Section 76-3-301 or
by a term of imprisonment up to six months, or by both the fine and term of
imprisonment.
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), the governing body may
prescribe a minimum civil penalty for the violation of any municipal
ordinance by a fine not to exceed the maximum class B misdemeanor fine
under Section 76-3-301.
(b) A municipality may not impose a civil penalty and adjudication for
the violation of a municipal moving traffic ordinance.
Utah Code, Title 10, Chapter 8, Section 60:
They may declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose
fines upon persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist.
Utah Code, Title 10, Chapter 8, Section 84:
(1) The municipal legislative body may pass all ordinances and rules, and
make all regulations, not repugnant to law, necessary for carrying into effect
or discharging all powers and duties conferred by this chapter, and as are
necessary and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health, and
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort,
and convenience of the city and its inhabitants, and for the protection of
property in the city.
(2) The municipal legislative body may enforce obedience to the
ordinances with fines or penalties in accordance with Section 10-3-703.
Utah Code, Title 10, Chapter 11: Reproduced in the addendum to Decker's brief.
Ogden City Municipal Code Title 1, Chapter 4A: Reproduced in the addendum.
Ogden City Municipal Code Title 1, Chapter 4B: Reproduced in the addendum.
Ogden City Municipal Code Title 12, Chapter 4: Reproduced in the addendum.
4
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ogden City accepts the statement of the case as contained in Decker's brief
RELEVANT FACTS
The following facts are relevant to the issues raised on appeal:
1. At all times relevant to this appeal, Weston Decker was the owner, agent or
occupant (responsible person) of real property located at 2026 Madison
Avenue, in Ogden City. Trial Transcript, pp. 3-6. l
2. At all times relevant to this appeal, Ogden City had in effect an ordinance
governing property maintenance for all property within the city. Trial
Transcript, p. 3; see also Ogden City Municipal Code § 12-4-1, et. seq.,
contained in Addendum.
3. The ordinance enables the city to require a responsible person to correct
conditions violating the property maintenance regulations on property that
was in violation of the ordinance and to assess penalties against or seek
remedies from the responsible person. Trial Transcript, p. 43; Ogden City
Municipal Code § 12-4-8, contained in Addendum.
4. Although the property maintenance standards allow for civil penalties to
accrue daily, it is the practice of Ogden City to re-inspect each property

1

The trial transcript is found in the record on appeal as item number 62.
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about every 15 days and assess additional penalties only when the property
is still in violation of the standards. Trial Transcript, p. 19.
5. On October 31, 2006, Mr. Decker was issued a warning letter from Ogden
City that the Madison Avenue property was in violation of the property
maintenance regulations and directing him to comply with the city
ordinance. Trial Transcript, pp. 3-4; Plaintiffs Exhibit 11.
6. The notice of violation informed Mr. Decker of the need to cure the
violation, the potential penalties for failure to correct the violations, and of
his right to request a hearing if he disagreed with the finding of a violation.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 11.
7. The required filing fee for a hearing is $25.00. Trial Transcript p. 33;
Plaintiffs Exhibit 11.
8. An inspection of the Madison property on November 16, 2006, showed that
the property had not been cleaned up and a civil citation and a fine of $125
was assessed against Mr. Decker. Trial Transcript pp. 8-9; Plaintiffs Exhibit
1.

2

The trial exhibits are found in the record on appeal as item number 63.
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9. The Madison property was inspected on December 4, 2006, and due to the
continuing violation a civil fine was assessed in the amount of $250.00. Trial
Transcript pp. 12-13; Plaintiffs Exhibit 2.
10. The Madison property was inspected on December 21, 2006, and due to the
continuing violation a civil fine was assessed in the amount of $500.00. Trial
Transcript pp. 13-14; Plaintiffs Exhibit 3.
11. Additional inspections of the Madison property from January 2007, through
September 2007 disclosed continuing violations and six additional citations
were issued, each with a fine in the amount of $500.00. Plaintiffs Exhibit 4,
5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
12. The total amount of all civil fines for the Madison Avenue property was
$3,875.00. Trial Transcript, p. 39.
13. Each citation included, on the reverse side, a notice that an administrative
hearing was available upon request and payment of a $25 non-refundable
filing fee. Trial Transcript, pp. 17-18, 26; Plaintiffs Exhibit 14.
14. At some point in the process of receiving the notice of violation and the
assessment of civil fines, Mr. Decker inquired about a possible hearing, but
refused to pay the filing fee. As a result no hearing was held. Trial
Transcript, p. 33.

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

15. At no time did Ogden City choose to use city funds to abate the property
maintenance violations at the Madison Avenue property. Trial Transcript, p.

i

40.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The rights contained in Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution include
a number of procedures which serve to protect the due process rights of a person in
a criminal prosecution who is accused of violating the law. Among these rights is
the guarantee that no accused person need advance fees to secure any of those due
process procedures prior to a final judgment. There is no basis in the Utah
Constitution to extend the right to not pay a fee to a civil proceeding where a
person has not been criminally charged. If the Court addresses the broader issue of
due process under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, an argument that
was not directly ruled on at trial, then it will see that Ogden City's requirement that
a small fee be paid prior to holding a hearing on a property maintenance violation
does not violate any constitutional right and adequately meets the flexible nature of
due process as applied to that type of proceeding. This is particularly the case here,
where Mr. Decker did not provide any evidence that he was unable to pay the
required fee and has chosen to mount a facial attack against the fee.

8
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,

Utah municipalities are given broad power to address nuisances within their
boundaries. They are specifically authorized to impose civil fines against persons
who do not comply with ordinances describing property maintenance procedures.
In addition, the legislature has recognized that there are times when a city may
elect to expend public funds to abate a nuisance condition on private property
when the responsible person has failed to take necessary steps to address the
problem. The legislature has created a process that a city may follow to collect
those costs through the county tax and assessment rolls. In order to take advantage
of this method of collection, a city must follow specific procedures outlined in
Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code. This statutory method of collecting costs
does not, however, limit the ability of a city to elect not to abate a nuisance and
choose, instead, to assess civil penalties against the person responsible for the
property. To hold otherwise would severely handicap cities ability to adequately
address the issue of neglected property. Due to the absence of any direct conflict
between the assessment of a civil fine and the choice not to expend city funds to
perform abatement on private property, the use by Ogden City of civil fines to
encourage compliance with its property maintenance standards does not violate the
Utah Constitution.

9
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ARGUMENT

Owners and occupants of real property in Ogden City are expected to
maintain the exterior areas of their property free of junk and debris in compliance
1

with local ordinances. Ogden Municipal Code § 12-4-1. When an inspection
officer observes conditions that violate the standards adopted by ordinance, a
notice of violation is prepared and the responsible party is given time to bring the
property into compliance with the ordinance. Ogden Municipal Code § 1-4B-3. If
the responsible party fails to act, the inspector may send additional notices and
assess civil penalties or fines. These fines may be assessed on a daily basis and
increase in amount up to a maximum of $500 per day. Ogden Municipal Code §§
1-4B-4, 1-4B-5, 12-4-8.
Responsible parties who receive an initial or subsequent notice have several
options. They may clean up the property and avoid future penalties, they may
negotiate with the inspector for additional time, they may file an administrative
appeal which requires payment of a $25 fee, or they may sit back and do nothing.
Regardless of which option they choose, there is no self executing action through
which the city may collect any penalty or fine. The failure to act might result in
criminal charges being brought through the filing and service of an information; it
might result in a collection action being filed to collect the assessed but unpaid
10
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penalties; and it might result in the city taking action to abate the violations and
collect the costs incurred as provided by statute.

I. The Provision in the Ogden City Municipal Code Requiring Payment of an
Appeal Fee by Persons Who Have Been Given a Warning or Civil Citation
for Failure to Maintain the Exterior of their Property Does Not Violate Due
Process.
While it is true that Ogden City requires payment of a fee by persons given a
warning or citation and who are responsible for the care of property to appeal the
issue of whether the property is in violation of the city's property maintenance
laws, there is no evidence in this case that any of Decker's constitutional rights
were violated by this requirement. First, because this is not a criminal case, Decker
was not deprived of rights otherwise available to accused persons in a criminal
prosecution. Second, general due process considerations do not require a free
hearing in every case. Finally, the total amount of civil penalties recognized by the
trial court was not excessive.
A. Decker Has Not Been Subject to Criminal Prosecution in this Case.
Decker argues that Article I, Section 7 and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution, when read together, entitle him to an administrative hearing without
having to pay a hearing fee. The use of Article I, Section 12 to make this argument
11
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is an inappropriate expansion of that section. Although it is true that Article I,
Section 12, includes a long list of rights that provide due process of law to an
accused person in a criminal prosecution, it does not stand for the proposition put
forth by Decker, that it "prevents the government from requiring the payment of

1

any fee as a pre-condition to secure any of the rights guaranteed by the Utah
Constitution." Decker Brief, pp 8-9. Instead, when Article I, Section 12 guarantees
that" [i]n no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed," the rights it is
referring to are the rights specifically described in that section. Decker has
provided no case law or historic evidence that the restriction on payment of fees
was ever intended to be applied outside of the criminal context. Although the city
can, and sometimes does, file criminal charges when a person refuses to comply
with property maintenance ordinances, the judgment awarded in this case was not
the result of a criminal prosecution.
There is no doubt that if an information is filed, the accused is entitled to all
of the protections of the constitutions of Utah and the United States. Had the city
chosen to file criminal charges against Decker for violating the city's property
maintenance code, he would have received a hearing on the charges without cost
prior to final judgment. But there were no criminal charges in this case, no
information, and no possibility that Decker would face jail time for ignoring the
12
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requirements of the law over a long period of time. Decker attributes the city's
choice of action to "a governmental practice [that] has arisen to 'accuse' citizens of
wrongdoing, but in a manner carefully crafted to avoid the 'constitutional rights'
guaranteed to the citizens by the Utah Constitution." Decker Brief, p. 19 (quotation
marks in original). The fact that a city utilizes a civil process to assess fines for
violations of its ordinances does not mean that it has denied anyone's
constitutional rights - it simply means that the city finds the use of civil penalties
to be a better option than enforcing every violation through the filing of
misdemeanor charges. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703 (West 2004) (cities may
impose either civil fines or criminal penalties for violations of local ordinance).
B. The Evidence Does Not Support A Claim That Decker Was Denied
Due Process
Perhaps in recognition of the fact that the Utah Constitution does not directly
apply to his case, Decker argues that "the interplay between Section 7 ["due
process"] and Section 12 ["the rights herein guaranteed"] is clear, by reference to
3

In footnote 1 at page 20 of his brief, Decker raises a question about why he was
expected to pay a civil fine when there had been no conviction or sentencing. This
allegation is based on the provisions of title 1, chapter 4A of the Ogden Municipal
Code. While chapter 4 article A does allow for a judge to impose these penalties
upon conviction in a criminal prosecution, it is chapter 4 article B of that title
which describes the process for imposing civil penalties when there is no criminal
proceeding. It is somewhat curious the Decker does not recognize the distinction
since he quotes directly from article 4B on page 19 of his brief.
13
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the unambiguous text." Decker Brief, p. 16. Although it is clear that Article I,
Section 12 describes certain due process protections for persons charged in
criminal cases; there is no clear or unambiguous text that the general due process
protections in Article I, Section 7, require incorporation of these criminal due

1

process guarantees in non-criminal proceedings. Decker uses this supposed
"interplay" to raise a facial due process argument against the city's appeal fee. The
court should reject this argument because Decker did not raise it before the trial
court and because hearing fee does not, on its face, rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.
/.

Decker did not raise an Article I, Section 7, Due Process claim at
trial

(

Decker waived the right to challenge the City's appeal fee based on the due
process clause of the Utah Constitution by failing to raise the argument before the

<

trial court.
It is axiomatic that, before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the
record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon. Moreover, the party must
specifically raise the issue, such that it is brought "to a 'level of
consciousness1 before the trial court. This requirement serves the interests of
judicial economy and orderly procedure by not only giving the trial court a
chance to correct error, but by making the parties crystallize issues prior to
appeal. When issues are not brought to the trial court's attention in a timely
manner, they are deemed waived, precluding this court from considering
their merits on appeal.
14
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Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281,288 (citations,
quotations and alterations omitted). At trial, Decker's counsel argued that charging
a fee for an administrative hearing violated article I section 12 of the Utah
Constitution. At no time did counsel directly refer to article I section 7, nor did he
specifically address due process outside of the context of the article I section 12
discussion. In order to fully present this concern, the relevant portions of the trial
where due process may have been raised will be discussed. After the city presented
its evidence, Decker's counsel made a motion to dismiss, and stated:
MR. HOMER: ... You don't have to read very far in the Constitution to see
that there are in the Constitution certain due process ideas. The bottom line
is, I think the city's ordinance requiring Mr. Decker to pay that $25 fee and
without paying the fee he has no rights to adjudicate that, that $25 fee
violates that portion of the constitution where it says in all cases - let me see
if I can find this. It's in the state constitution, Your Honor. In all cases or in
no case - let's see, let me just read it here. "In no instance shall any accused
person"THE COURT:
Where are you reading?
MR. HOMER: Section 12, halfway between 10 and 14.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. HOMER: In no[] instance - I'm about six lines down into the middle "In no instance shall any accused person before final judgment be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed." I submit
that that applied to the Ogden City hearing request and when they deny him
the right to have that hearing, they have then infringed upon a very valuable
due process right and so if that hearing wasn't held because, even though he
had asked for it, they didn't have it because he didn't pay the fee, I submit
that totally undermines the city's claim for the $3900 because he asked for
15
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the hearing and the city didn't give it to him. So I raise that constitutional
issue.
There are some interrelationships between that idea under the Utah
Constitution and maybe a more generalized due process right under the
United States Constitution.
Transcript, p. 65, line 5, through p. 66 line 7. The trial judge then asked the city if
it "want[ed] to respond to the Article I, Section 12" issue. Id. at p. 66, lines 21-22.
As the judge considered the issue, he addressed the context of Article I,

j

section 12 in light of language appearing earlier in that section. Id. p. 70 lines 1125 and p. 71, lines 1-15. The trial judge then found "for the purpose of the Motion

<

to Dismiss, that Article I, Section 12 is inapplicable in this setting because Mr.
Decker has not been charged criminally in this setting ... I don't think that Article
I, Section 12 is written with the civil setting in mind." Id. p. 71, lines 18-24.
Decker's counsel subsequently discussed with the trial court the nature of the head
note, or title, to Article I, Section 12, when he said:
MR. HOMER: ... I understand your ruling your Honor. You're aware that
these little head notes in the code section w[h]ere it says Sectionl2 and then
brackets, rights of accused persons, that rights of accused persons is not
phrasing in the Utah Constitution? You're aware of that?
THE COURT: Well, I don't know whether I was or not. I'm interested in
what come[s] after the bracketed language.
i

Trial Transcript, p. 72, lines 18-25. The only additional argument from Decker's
counsel that may have pertained to a due process concern was a statement that: "I
have a little trouble with the somewhat cavalier style that the city is saying, Well,
16
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you have these Constitutional rights but only if it's a criminal case." Id., p. 73,
lines 11-14. Even if this comment was meant to broaden Decker's due process
argument, it did not focus the trial court such an expanded claim and so, when the
trial court summarized its ruling, it found as follows:
Mr. Homer then advanced his Constitutional argument that under Article I,
Section 12 that Mr. Decker was denied his constitutional right, his
constitutional rights under Article I, Section 12 by being required to pay a
non-refundable fee to appeal the decision of the city. Specifically Mr. Homer
relies upon the language that says in no instance shall any accused person
before final judgment be compelled to advance any money or fee to secure
the rights herein guaranteed and as I previously indicated, I find that Article
I, Section 12, deals with criminal prosecutions as it says it does, in criminal
prosecutions the accused shall[,] and then it outlines all of the rights that
pertain to the individual... And so I do not find that Article I. Section 12 has
application in this case where this is a civil case.
Id., p. 80, lines 15-20 and p. 81, lines 1-6. At no point was the trial court ever put
on notice that Decker was making a due process claim under Article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution or under any line of case law dealing with due process other
than in the context of Article I, Sectionl2. As a result, this Court should not allow
Decker to broaden his constitutional claim on appeal to ask whether "collecting a
fee in advance as a pre-condition for the exercise of those 'due process' rights"
violates a property owner's right to due process of law. Decker Brief, p. 2. The
issue addressed by the trial court, and which this Court could consider on appeal, is
whether Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution prohibits Ogden City from
requiring a property owner, or other responsible person, to pay a fee prior to
17
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obtaining an administrative hearing which would address claims that the property
is not in violation of the city's nuisance ordinance. Or, in other words, does the
right guaranteed to an accused person as part of a criminal proceeding to not pay a
fee prior to final judgment extend to individuals who are served with a notice of a
potential civil penalty for failure to maintain property for which they are
responsible. The reasons why this question should be answered in the negative
have already been presented.
ii.

Decker does not have standing to challenge the fee.

Decker did not provide any evidence at trial that he was incapable of paying
the hearing fee. As a result, even if a due process claim was properly raised,
Decker can only attack the hearing fee on its face, and not as applied in his specific
case. Decker does not deny that he was provided with notice of the alleged
violation. Nor does he claim that an administrative hearing was not made available
to him where he could address the nature of the violation. His only claim is that the
requirement to pay a fee in order to obtain the hearing is, in all circumstances,
unconstitutional.
Although the issue of whether due process concerns are implicated by a fee
requirement is not frequently reported, the only time such a concern has been
recognized is when a person has shown that the fee directly affected the ability to
18
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obtain a hearing or receive proper treatment. In this context, the United States
Supreme Court has said:
Just as a generally valid notice procedure may fail to satisfy due process
because of the circumstances of the defendant, so too a cost requirement,
valid on its face, may offend due process because it operates to foreclose a
particular party's opportunity to be heard.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380, 91 S. Ct. 780, 787, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113
(1971) (emphasis added). In Boddie, a group of welfare recipients challenged a
Connecticut requirement that court fees and costs of service be paid in order to
obtain a divorce. Id. at 372. After they had requested a waiver of the fees and were
denied, they claimed that the fee requirement was unconstitutional as it applied to
their circumstances. Id. Although the Supreme Court agreed with their position,
what is significant for this case is that it clarified its holding to make clear that the
requirement of payment of a fee does not always rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. "In concluding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that these appellants be afforded an opportunity to go into
court to obtain a divorce, we wish to re-emphasize that we go no further than
necessary to dispose of the case before us, a case where the bona fides of both
appellants1 indigency and desire for divorce are here beyond dispute." Id. at 382. If
due process always required a free hearing, the Supreme Court would not have
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made specific reference to the circumstances of particular parties and the
undisputed nature of their indigence.
When Boddie has been applied in other circumstances, it has always been
with a focus on the person specifically affected, and how the individual's inability
to pay deprived the person of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Little
v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct 2202, 68 L.Ed.2d 627 (1981) (indigent defendant
required to pay for blood test to challenge paternity denied due process). In this
case, Decker provided no evidence that he was unable to pay the fee in order to
obtain a hearing. The only evidence provided to the trial court was that he either
failed or refused to make the payment. On cross examination of the city's code
enforcement officer, Decker's attorney engaged in the following dialogue:
Q. Going back to [exhibit] 14 then, Mr. Porter, paragraph 7, appeal process
is available and then it says "In the event you believe" and that would be I
guess the person to whom this is issued, "you have been issued this citation
in error, you may appeal the imposition of the civil penalty by filing an
application for hearing along with a $25 non-refundable filing fee." That's
what that paragraph says, right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did Mr. Decker attempt to file an application for hearing, do you know?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he pay the $25 filing fee?
A. No, sir.
Q. He didn't. Did the city act on his application for hearing?
A. By act, did we have the hearing?
Q. Or decide not to have a hearing? I realize that's a dual question.
A. No, the hearing was not scheduled because he did not pay the application
fee.
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Q. Okay. So the city's process is that it costs $25 if you want to challenge
these accusations against Mr. Decker?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And all other similarly situated persons, right? Everybody who gets a
citation, civil citation they have to pay the fee?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is there any process in the city's ordinance for waiving that $25 fee?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Trial Transcript, p. 33, line 3 through p. 34, line 8. There was no follow up with the
officer as to what Decker's reasons may have been or whether Decker's failure to
pay the fee had anything to do with an inability to pay. Furthermore, Decker did
not put on any evidence of his own that would explain why he did not pay the fee.
Instead, after the city presented its evidence and after Decker's motion to dismiss
was denied, Decker chose not to present evidence. See Trial Transcript, p. 72, lines
8-13. As a result, Decker's due process claim should be denied for lack of
standing.
This case bears a strong similarity to Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah
1980). In that case, two individuals challenged the constitutionality of a
requirement that a fee be paid to appear on a ballot in an election. Id. at 241. The
allegations of impecuniosity were not proven to the satisfaction of the trial court
and were not presented to the appellate court. Id. at 242. In that case, the Utah
Supreme Court observed:
A constitutional question does not arise merely because it is raised and a
decision sought thereon; rather, the constitutionality of a statue ought to be
considered in the light of the standing of the one who seeks to raise the
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question and of its particular application. An attack on the validity of a
statue cannot be made by parties whose interests have not been, and are not
about to be, prejudiced by the operation of the statute.
Id. In this case, although it is undisputed that Decker did not pay the appeal fee and
that he did not receive an administrative hearing, his failure to produce evidence
that he was incapable of paying the fee does not establish that Decker was
personally prejudiced by the requirement. Therefore, he is not in a position to
challenge the constitutionality of the fee. See, e.g. State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278,
283 (Utah 1994) (defendant bears initial burden of establishing indigence),, As the
Hoyle court reasoned, "[t]he far-reaching effect of a constitutional determination
upon the rights of the general public negatives any consideration of a constitutional
question presented by a friendly or fictitious suit or on admitted or agreed facts.
Such questions area only to be reached after a full disclosure of all material facts."
Hoyle, 606P.2d at 242-243.
Hi.

Even if Decker has standing, the fee does not violate his Due Process
rights.

In this case, Decker was assessed civil fines and, when he failed to pay the
fines, the city obtained a small claims judgment against him. He appealed to the
district court where the judgment was affirmed following a trial de novo. Utah
Constitution Article I, Section 7, provides: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law." The guarantee of due process
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does not contain an internal standard for determining when it has been violated.
Furthermore, "[d]ue process ... is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances. The requirements of due process
depend upon the specific context in which they are applied." Chen v. Stewart, 2004
UT 82, f25, 100 P.3d 1177,1185 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Because Decker has not provided the Court with a method of analyzing his
due process claim under the state constitution, Ogden City will apply the three
elements adopted by the United States Supreme Court for the federal due process
clause as discussed in Streater. These elements are: "the private interests at stake,
the risk the procedures used will lead to erroneous results and the probable value of
the suggested procedural safeguard; and the governmental interests affected." 452
U.S. at 13. See also, V-l Oil Co. v. Dep't ofEnvtl Quality, Div. of Solid &
Hazardous Waste, 939 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Utah 1997)(applying similar test as
described in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47
L.Ed.2dl8(1976)).
The private interest at stake in the context of the determination of a property
maintenance violation and the assessment of a civil fine does not rise to the same
level of significance as fundamental issues of freedom of movement or the ability
to determine one's familial relations. A monetary, or economic, interest does not
require the heightened types of protection that were at play in Boddie (the ability to
23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

obtain a divorce) or Streater (the creation of a parent-child relationship). In the
case of civil fines, the assessment of the fine itself does not deprive a responsible
person of any property. Although the failure to address the violation may
ultimately lead to a money judgment and subsequent collection, this type of private
interest is not entitled to any heightened protection.
The risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous results is limited in
this case. The responsible party is first given an opportunity to clean up the
property before a civil fine is assessed, and the inspector is required to assess the
fine against a person who is connected with the management of the property. As a
result, it is unlikely that a fine would ever be assessed against a person who did not
bear responsibility under the ordinance. The procedural safeguard, not requiring
payment of a fee, may help an impecunious party, but given the fact that the fee is
only $25.00, there are very few people to whom the fee would serve as a bar to the
full exercise of their rights. And, as addressed above, there is no evidence in this
case that Decker was unable to pay the fee.
Finally, the governmental interest in collecting the fee is important. The fee
helps offset a small portion of the costs associated with processing, scheduling and
holding the hearing. By not charging a fee, the city would face the prospect of
increased costs due to many more hearings being scheduled, while responsible
parties are not required to make even a minimal commitment to the process. On
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balance, the fee serves to make the hearing process widely available while
imposing a minor cost on the responsible party.
Decker does not argue that the notice of the violation was defective, that the
potential penalties were not disclosed, that a hearing process was not available, or
that the hearing process would be conducted before someone who was not
impartial. His only complaint is that the need to pay a fee in order to receive the
hearing deprived him of his property without due process of law. Based on the
facts and circumstances associated with the city's property maintenance standards,
the fee does not violate his due process rights.
C. Decker's Claim that the Civil Penalty is an Excessive Fine Was Not
Raised Before the District Court and Should Be Dismissed
On pages 22 and 23 of his brief, Decker challenges the amount of the civil
citations, both individually and cumulatively, as being unconstitutionally
excessive. In so doing, Decker cites a line of cases discussing the difference
between taxes and fees. In those cases where fees are collected, Utah courts have
routinely held that the fee cannot be excessive when compared to the service
provided. There are two primary reasons why this argument is unavailing to
Decker's claims.
First, the constitutional claim which Decker is attempting to make is not
really a due process claim, but is more properly classified under the excessive fine
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portion of the constitution. See Utah Constitution Article 1, Section 9. Nowhere in
the transcript from the district court does it show that Decker raised the issue of the
amount of the fine as a specific constitutional violation. In addition, there is no
indication in the transcript that the trial court entered any findings or order
addressing the constitutionality of the civil penalties. The only point at which
Decker raised the issue of fines was in the context of his argument that title 10,
chapter 11 of the Utah Code limits the ability of cities to do anything other than
abate the violations when a responsible party refuses to do so. See Trial Transcript,
p. 73, line 14 through p. 74, line 9. Whether the total amount of the fines was
excessive cannot, therefore, be raised for the first time on appeal. Holmstrom v.
C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT App 239, 8 P.3d 281, 288.
Second, the dollar amount of a civil fine is expressly authorized by state law
and need not correlate with any service rendered. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-703
(West 2004) (civil fines allowed in amount not to exceed maximum class B
misdemeanor fine). The whole point behind a civil fine is to deter individuals from
violating municipal ordinances and to encourage them to come into compliance as
soon as possible without having to resort to the more harsh penalties associated
with the criminal law. They are not a regulatory fee or a fee for a service and do
not, therefore, need to have any relation to whether a specific city service was
provided or to the cost or lack of cost of such a service.
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II. The Ability of Utah Cities to Collect Costs They Incur to Abate Nuisance
Properties Does Not Bar Their Ability to Collect Civil Fines from
Responsible Parties.
Ogden City is entitled to assess civil penalties against Decker for his failure
to maintain property within the city limits even though a state statute controls the
conditions under which municipalities are allowed to recover abatement costs they
incur on private property. Title 105 Chapter 11 of the Utah Code describes a
detailed process by which cities are able to perform abatement work and then
recover those costs either through litigation or through an assessment on the county
tax rolls. Decker argues that this state law trumps the ability of Ogden City to
assess civil penalties against those who are responsible for property where junk
and debris has accumulated and that the city's "process in clear contradiction to the
statute ought to be 'unconstitutional...."' Decker Brief, p. 24. The trial court ruled
that the city could assess civil fines against a responsible person without
conflicting with the state statute. 4
4

MR. HOMER: ... I believe [tjhere's some case law out there that talks about
these types of situation[s] where ... municipal ordinances conflict with state law
and Pd like to just kind of share those with the Court because I think that this
whole idea, it can't conflict with state law and that's kind of my thing. So Pd like
toTHE COURT: But, my ruling is I don't read it to conflict. So I guess my concern is
that you're going to cite me cases that tells the Court what to do in the event of a
conflict and I respect that 27
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The Utah Supreme Court has said that "where a city ordinance is in conflict
with a state statute, the ordinance is invalid at its inception." Hansen v. Eyre, 2005
UT 29, fl5, 116 P.3d 290; see also Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 (West 2004)
(municipal legislative body may pass ordinances not repugnant to law for carrying
into effect or discharging municipal powers and duties). "In determining whether
an ordinance is in 'conflict' with general laws, the test is whether the ordinance
permits or licenses that which the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa. Id.
(citation and quotations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court subsequently stated,
however, that it "explicitly reject[s] the doctrine of implied conflict and hold[s]
that an ordinance is not unconstitutional merely because it implicitly conflicts with
a state statute." Salt Lake City v. Newman, 2006 UT 69,110, 148 P.3d 931. The
Newman court then explained its holding as follows:
Therefore, in the absence of express conflict, we will uphold a challenged
ordinance unless there is some indication of incompatibility with the state
statutory scheme. Implied conflict alone does not render an ordinance
unconstitutional; impermissible conflict instead arises when provisions are
contradictory in the sense that they cannot coexist.

MR. HOMER: And you're not seeing the conflict.
THE COURT: - but I don't see the conflict. I read the two statutes to work
together.
Trial Transcript, p. 75, lines 6-19.
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Id. (citation and quotations omitted). In this case, Decker is essentially asking the
Court to find that, when an owner of property refuses to take care of that property,
Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code limits the ability of municipalities to address
weeds, garbage and nuisance objects or structures through any method other than
the expenditure of municipal funds to perform the clean-up of such property.
Although that chapter provides certain protections to landowners whose property is
cleaned up at the expense of a municipality, it does not prohibit cities from
imposing other sanctions when the owner fails to comply with property
maintenance regulations. In addition, the scope of the finding which Decker
proposes would not only frustrate municipal powers granted by the state
legislature, but would seriously inhibit the operation of municipal government
throughout the state.
A. Ogden City's Civil Penalty Provisions Do Not Conflict With State Law.
Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code provides a detailed process with
multiple forms of notice and opportunity to object when a municipality uses its
own funds for the abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse, or any unsightly or
deleterious objects or structures, and then seeks to collect the costs of such
abatement from the owner of the land. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-11-1, et. seq.
(West 2004). In order to recover these costs, a city must appoint an inspector and
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the inspector's duties shall include such things as: examining property for
violations; sending specific notices of observed violations to the owner or occupant
of the property; employing assistance to abate the violations if the owner or
occupant has not done so within a reasonable time; preparing an itemized
statement of the costs incurred and mail it to the property owner; and, if costs are
to be collected through the county treasurer, providing certain notice of the costs to
the county treasurer. Id. 5
Decker fixates on the use of the word shall as it applies to the duties of a
municipal inspector in the statutory collection process and then claims that because
Ogden City did not clean up the property itself, it cannot hold him responsible for
civil penalties when he did not comply with repeated notices that the property
violated the city's property maintenance ordinance. In his argument, Decker does
not explain how Ogden City's civil penalty provisions directly conflict with the
state statute, nor does he acknowledge the context in which the inspector's
mandatory duties are performed.
/.

Civil penalties complement the statutory method of collecting public
abatement costs incurred on private property.

5

The Utah legislature changed portions of the statutory scheme in the 2011
legislative session. Although those changes moved the process for an owner to
obtain review of the actual costs incurred from the county to the city, the actions
that the inspector is required to undertake as part of the abatement process did not
substantially change.
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The use of civil penalties does nothing to interfere with the provisions of
Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code. By placing the burden primarily on an
owner or occupant to be responsible for the condition of property, the city saves
both it and the responsible party both time and money. Those who are in charge of
a piece of property are almost always in a better position to clean up junk, debris
and address other maintenance violations than is a municipality. By placing the
burden of maintenance on the owner or occupant, the city also better respects the
property rights of those individuals. Civil penalties provide an incentive for the
owner or occupant to respond to a situation where junk and debris needs to be
removed from the property. None of these considerations conflict with the
statutory process which a city uses to collect its costs when it decides to undertake
the abatement process at its own cost. If a city ordinance authorized an inspector to
proceed with abatement without notice of a violation or to recover costs incurred
for abatement without providing a statement of the costs for the owner's review,
there would be direct conflict with the statutory provisions. There is no conflict,
however, when a city chooses not to spend its own dollars on abatement and assess
civil, or even criminal, penalties on the responsible party when that person fails to
act. The trial court agreed with this position. It said:
I think Mr. Stratford, you indicated that the city chose to proceed by way of
imposition of fines rather that abating the nuisance. I think Mr. Homer's
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argument is well taken and well made that if the city had chosen to abate the
nuisance, then it would have had to have complied with the provisions
contained in 10-11-2,10-11-3 where I focused on the "shall" language and I
think it's clear what the city is required to do in the event it decides to abate.
But I think that [section] 10-8-60 provides the city with the option of doing
one or both. It simply says the city may. It doesn't say shall. It doesn't say
shall obey and shall impose fines. It says may abate and may impose fines,
in this case based on the statutory reading, I'm going to find that the city's
decision to proceed under this imposition of fines provision in 10-8-60 is not
inconsistent with the abatement provisions contained in 10-11-1 and 11-2
and 10-11-3 specifically. So on that limited basis, I'm going to deny the
Motion to Dismiss.
Trial Transcript, p. 68, line 12 through p. 69, line 4.
Decker's claim is essentially one of implied conflict. The reasoning goes as
follows: If the legislature established a detailed appointment, notice and hearing
process for a city to collect the costs incurred by it as part of an abatement, then
any other process adopted to address the issue of property maintenance must
automatically be disallowed. This is like telling a carpenter that because he is given
a new screwdriver, he can no longer use a hammer and nail. "When reviewing
local government action, we give local government great latitude in creating
solutions to the many challenges it faces, unless the action is arbitrary or is directly
prohibited by, or is inconsistent with the policy of, the state or federal laws or the
constitution of Utah or of the United States." Price Development Co., L.P. v. Orem
City, 2000 UT 26, \ 10, 995 P.2d 1237. The provisions of Title 10, Chapter 11,
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contain no preemptive language nor does it contain language denying preemption
of alternative schemes for addressing property maintenance.
ii.

The context of the statutory collection method is consistent with the
imposition and collection of civil penalties

Tellingly, Decker does not identify for this Court how the imposition of civil
penalties in the form of fines creates a direct conflict with the statutory scheme for
collecting costs incurred for abatement. In his brief, Decker basically argues that
because the legislature has enacted a statute providing how cities can recoup
expenses incurred in abating nuisances on private property, it must therefore be a
direct conflict - and a violation of his due process rights - for a city to "attempt to
impose and collect 'civil penalties' in excess of the amounts prescribed by
controlling statute (which says [sic], essentially, $0)..." Decker Brief, pp. 26-27.6
It is apparently Decker's belief, or at least the logical extension of his argument,
that property owners and those responsible for maintaining property essentially get
a free pass to ignore property maintenance standards unless the city takes
affirmative action, at the public expense, to clean up junk, debris and other
nuisance conditions on the property.
6

This due process argument was not made to the trial court and cannot, therefore,
be raised for the first time on appeal. Holmstrom v. C.R. England, Inc., 2000 UT
App 239, 8 P.3d 281,288. Ogden City is not here responding to the due process
allegation raised in the brief, but to the separate issue of whether its assessment of
civil penalties is a valid exercise of its municipal power.
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In this context, it may be helpful to look at the structure of the cost recovery
statute. The inspector is given a number of duties which appear to be mandatory.
The duty with the most significance to Decker's argument is that "the inspector
shall... at the expense of the municipality, employ necessary assistance and cause
the weeds, garbage, refuse, objects, or structures to be removed or destroyed ...."
Utah Code Ann. § 10-11-3 (West Supp. 2010). Decker seizes on this mandatory
language and criticizes Ogden City for not complying with the statute and
'"crank[ing] out' the citation letters." Decker Brief, p. 24. Although the word
"shall is generally presumed to indicate a mandatory requirement, ... on occasion,
it has also been interpreted as merely directory. Factors to be considered in this
determination include whether the provision affects substantial rights and whether
the provision is necessary to effectuate the intent of the statute." Southwick v.
Southwick, 2011 UT App 222,113 (quotations and citations omitted).
The intent of the statute, in this case, is to guarantee that an owner does not
have to pay for abatement costs incurred by a city without having first been given
an opportunity to make the correction or to review the costs incurred for errors and
file a challenge requiring review of such costs. Thus, in order to collect its costs,
the city must incur costs and the inspector's duties are mandatory. These
mandatory duties protect the property owner from having to pay costs that were
incurred without prior notice. But in carrying out the overall objective of
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remediating junk and debris throughout the city, it makes no sense for the inspector
to be required to incur costs to clean up every property on which junk and debris is
observed. Compare, Price Development, 2000 UT 26, at f 15 (city's plan to sustain
sales tax base did not conflict with objectives of state development act).
In the final analysis, the fundamental question that must be answered in
determining if the imposition of civil penalties for failing to maintain one's
property is unconstitutional is whether the civil penalties cannot coexist with the
process established by the legislature allowing municipalities to collect costs
incurred for abatement. Regardless of Decker's efforts to contrast the "non-existent
expenses (of clean-up) the CITY did not incur" with "[t]he CITY's attempt to
collect the '$500 per letter' fee," the answer to this question, as explained above, is
that the two processes can easily coexist. Decker Brief, p. 26. What is non-existent,
however, is any evidence of legislative intent to supplant municipal powers to
assess civil penalties merely because it created a method by which cities could
recover expenses incurred in abating nuisance properties.
B. Decker's Interpretation of Title 10 Chapter 11 of the Utah Code Would
Negate Powers Exclusively Recognized Elsewhere in the Utah Code

Decker's argument that municipalities cannot collect civil penalties in the
way of fines from responsible persons is further eroded when other parts of the
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municipal code are taken into consideration. The power to address nuisances is not
given to municipalities by title 10, chapter 11 of the Utah Code. This power is
actually recognized in section 10-8-60, where it is recognized that cities "may
declare what shall be a nuisance, and abate the same, and impose fines upon
persons who may create, continue or suffer nuisances to exist. Utah Code Ann. §
10-8-60 (West 2004). If, as Decker asserts, Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code
limits cities9 powers to only using municipal funds for abatement of garbage,
refuse, or unsightly or deleterious objects or structures and then seeking
reimbursement of those costs, what happens to cities express power to impose fines
on those persons who suffer nuisances to exist? Whatever support Decker5 s
argument may have is further eroded when the statute allowing cities to regulate '.;
nuisances is compared with the other enumerated powers of cities.
Most of the areas in which the legislature has specifically authorized cities to
act do not include specific language dealing with penalties. For these recognized
powers, section 10-8-84 provides blanket authority to "enforce obedience to the
ordinances with fines or penalties in accordance with Section 10-3-703." But in the
case of nuisances, the grant of power specifically authorizes the assessment of
fines as one method of dealing with the problem. As a result, Decker cannot simply
argue that the ability of Ogden City to collect a fine is trumped by the provisions of
Title 10, Chapter 11. Such a reading would require this Court to expressly
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determine that the result of one statute is to directly cause a separate statute to
become inoperable. The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
It is our duty to construe each act of the legislature so as to give it full force
and effect. When a construction of an act will bring it into serious conflict
with another act, our duty is to construe the acts to be in harmony and avoid
conflicts.
Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991). The trial judge correctly
applied this rule when he heard arguments in this case and concluded:
My reading of 10-8-60 is not inconsistent with what's contained in 10-11-1
and 10-11-2 and 10-11-3.... My understanding is that we're to read statutes
in a way that makes sense when we're trying to take two different statutory
provisions and work them together. The reading should be a reading that
gives effect to both statutes and in this case, the way I read it is exactly as I
tried to articulate the first time, and that is, that under 10-8-60 the
municipality may declare what shall be a nuisance and may abate the same
and may impose fines upon person who may create, continue or suffer
nuisances to exist.
Trial Transcript, p. 67, line 25 through p. 68, line 11.
Decker has not provided a satisfactory explanation of how these two statutes
can be harmonized under his theory of the case. During argument before the trial
court, Decker offered an opinion that perhaps nuisances should be classified into
two groups: those that are subject to recovery of costs under title 10, chapter 11,
and those that are not. See Trial Transcript, p. 62, line 9 through p. 64, line 9. The
fundamental problem with Decker's tiered approach, i.e., that some nuisances are
worthy of fines and others just have to be suffered until the city finds the time and
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money to remove them, is that there is no evidence that the legislature intended for
the statutes to be read in this way.
When title 10, chapter 11 was adopted, the legislature could have clarified
the general municipal power specifically allowing assessing fines for nuisances
and exempted specifically identified types of nuisances from the assessment of a
fine. It did not do so. As a result, the courts should not create a tiered nuisance
system when the legislature did not provide any indication that such a system was
intended. Instead, the more straightforward and acceptable interpretation is that the
legislature allows cities to abate nuisances and to impose fines for all nuisances but when a municipality uses its own funds to complete the abatement, it has
additional avenues to recover its reasonably incurred costs, but only by complying
with the terms of title 10, chapter 11.
C. Significant Public Policy Values Would Be Compromised if Decker's
Suggestion is Adopted That Title 10 Chapter 11 Prohibits Cities From
Assessing Civil Penalties for Nuisance Properties

There are a number of other significant problems with Decker's analysis that
a city can only choose to deal with certain property maintenance violations through
publicly funded abatement rather than by civil penalties. A few of the most
obvious will be briefly identified.
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First, the cost to local government would be unbearable. Cities have a finite
amount of resources that can be devoted to abating weeds, garbage, refuse and
unsightly and deleterious objects and structures. Even though a city is entitled to
recover costs incurred for abatement, it is simply unrealistic to believe that a city
can bear the time and expense associated with every property on which one of
these conditions may be found.
Second, cities would be stripped of their ability to encourage appropriate
action through the use of criminal penalties. In addition to civil penalties, cities can
enforce obedience to municipal ordinances through the criminal law. Utah Code
Ann. § 10-3-703 (West 2004). If Decker is correct, that Title 10, Chapter 11, is the
exclusive method by which a city may address property maintenance violations,
then it would follow that criminal penalties are also inapplicable. On the other
hand, if civil fines are not allowed, but criminal penalties are allowed, the
legislature would have created an awkward incentive for cities to file criminal
charges against responsible parties who do not respond to warnings that property
needs to be cleaned up.
Third, Decker's reading would lead to decreased compliance with local
ordinances. If a potentially responsible person knows that civil penalties may be
assessed, they are more likely to respond to a notice of violation voluntarily. If the
city's civil recourse is capped at the cost of abatement, the person can choose to
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simply wait the city out and know that eventually, if the city ever comes in and
cleans the property up, they will only have to pay the actual costs of the cleanup.
Such an approach would lead to less orderly rather than more orderly communities.
Finally, Decker's argument could easily lead to significant risk to public
health and welfare. Much of the reason that weeds, garbage and refuse need to be
controlled has nothing to do with aesthetics. Instead, it is directly related to
controlling the spread of noxious weeds and limiting the ability of rodents to
multiply and spread disease. Where a city does not have the resources to abate all
violations, and where responsible parties would be given an incentive to delay or
completely ignore the process of removing the offending items, the risk to public
health would be increased. For all of these reasons, it would be unjustified to
assume that the legislature intended to limit the powers of cities to control
nuisances through civil penalties when it adopted Title 10, Chapter 11 of the Utah
Code as a method of allowing the collection of the actual cost of an abatement
where city funds are expended.
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CONCLUSION
Decker is a responsible party against whom civil fines were assessed as
allowed by state law and implemented under local ordinance. The process utilized
by the city did not deprive Decker of due process of law and is consistent with
legislative enactments encouraging the proper maintenance of lands located within
cities. For the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that Ogden City's civil
enforcement process does not result in constitutional violations and the judgment
of the trial court should be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

day of August, 2011.
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ADDENDUM
Ogden City Municipal Code, Title 1, Chapter 4A (General Penalties)
Ogden City Municipal Code, Title 1, Chapter 4B (Code Violations and Penalties)
Ogden City Municipal Code, Title 12, Chapter 4 (Property Maintenance
Regulations)
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1-4A-1

1-4A-1
CHAPTER 4
CODE VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
ARTICLE A. GENERAL PENALTIES1

SECTION:
1-4A-1
1-4A-2
1-4A-3
1-4A-4
1-4A-5
1-4A-6

Penalties
Liability
Application Of Chapter
Applicability Of State Law
Prosecutions
Prosecutorial Discretion To Reduce Penalty

1-4A-1:

PENALTIES:

A.

General Penalty: Any person convicted of violating any provision of
the ordinances codified in this code, or ordinances hereafter
enacted, shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor unless otherwise
specified in such ordinance or interpreted by the court as a class C
misdemeanor or infraction, and such violations shall be punished as
follows:
1. For any person, other than a corporation, association, partnership,
or governmental instrumentality, convicted of an offense:
a. In the case of a class B misdemeanor, by a fine in any sum
not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or by imprisonment
for a term not longer than six (6) months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment;
b. In the case of a class C misdemeanor, by a fine in any sum
not exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00) or by imprisonment for
a term not exceeding ninety (90) days, or by both such fine and
imprisonment; and

1. Prior ordinance history: 1999 Code; Ord. 2005-27, 5-24-2005.
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c. In the case of an infraction, by a fine in any sum not
exceeding five hundred dollars ($500.00).
2. For a corporation, association, partnership,
instrumentality convicted of an offense:

or governmental

a. For a class B misdemeanor shall be in an amount not
exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000.00); and
b. For a class C misdemeanor or an infraction shall be an
amount not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
B.

Civil Penalties:
1. In addition to the penalties provided above, a court upon
conviction may sentence a person convicted of an offense, other
than a violation of title 10 of this code, to a civil penalty in the
following amounts:
a. For any violation where the city provided prior notice of such
violation and the person failed to comply with such notice, a civil
penalty in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00).
b. For any violation of title 11, "Police Regulations", of this code
where the person was convicted of the same offense within the last
two (2) years, or where the person was convicted of a felony within
the last four (4) years, a civil penalty in the following amounts:
Class B misdemeanor
Class C misdemeanor/infraction

$200.00
100.00

c. For a violation of title 13, "Animals", of this code where the
person was convicted of the same offense within the last two (2)
years, a civil penalty in the following amounts for the following
violations:
(1) Roaming dog violation or otherwise failing to keep a dog
from running at large in violation of section 13-2-6 of this
code, a civil penalty in the amount of one hundred dollars
($100.00); or
(2) Barking dog violation or otherwise maintaining a public
nuisance in violation of subsection 13-2-7A4 of this code, a
civil penalty in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00).
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(3) Maintaining a public nuisance determined to be a
dangerous dog or vicious animal in violation of subsection
13-2-7A6 or A7 of this code, a civil penalty in the amount of
five hundred dollars ($500.00).
d. For a violation of title 12, chapter 14, "Noise", of this code
where the person was convicted of the same offense within the last
two (2) years, a civil penalty in the amount of one hundred fifty
dollars ($150.00).
2. In no event shall a civil penalty when combined with any fine
imposed by the court exceed the maximum fine that may be imposed
for such offense, and such civil penalty shall be reduced accordingly.
3. No more than one civil penalty shall be imposed under this code
for any single criminal episode, and the highest applicable civil
penalty shall apply.
4. Civil penalties imposed under this section may be satisfied
through the performance of community service with the city at a rate
equal to the minimum wage.
5. The city, at its own option, may pursue independent collection of
such civil penalties in the civil courts if not collected by the court
having jurisdiction over the criminal offense.
C.

Costs: The court may also require a convicted defendant to pay
costs as provided in sections 77-32a-1 through 77-32a-14, Utah
Code Annotated or its successor provisions.

D.

Restitution: The court may also require a convicted defendant to
make restitution as provided in the crime victims restitution act,
chapter 38a, title 77, Utah Code Annotated, or its successor
provisions, which order may include costs incurred by the city in
abating a public nuisance related to the offense for which the
defendant is responsible.

E.

Prosecution Of Individual Not Precluded: A prosecution of, or civil
action against, a corporation, association or partnership, as an
entity, shall not preclude prosecutions of, or civil actions against,
individuals responsible for the action of such entities and shall not
preclude a separate fine, civil penalty or imprisonment or
combination thereof for those individuals, as well as a separate fine
or civil penalty for the business entity.

(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)
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1-4A-2:

LIABILITY:

A.

Employers And Agents: When the provisions of this code prohibit the
commission or omission of an act, not only the person actually doing
the prohibited thing or omitting the directed act, but also the
employer and all other persons concerned or aiding or abetting
therein shall be guilty of the offense or violation described and liable
for the penalties prescribed for the offense or violation.

B.

City Officers And Employees: No provision of this code designating
the duties of any officer or employee shall be so construed as to
make such officer or employee liable for any fine or penalty provided
for a failure to perform such duty, unless the intention of the city
council to impose such fine or penalty on such officer or employee is
specifically and clearly expressed in the section creating the duty.

(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4A-3:

APPLICATION OF CHAPTER:

A.

No Specific Penalty Declared: Whenever the doing of any act or the
omission to do any act constitutes a breach of any section or
provision of this code and there shall be no fine or penalty
specifically declared for such breach, the provisions of this article
shall apply.

B.

Continued Violation: In all instances where the violation of this code
is a continuing violation, a separate offense shall be deemed
committed upon each day during or on which the offense occurs or
continues.

C.

Offense Under Different Sections: In all cases where the same
offense is made punishable or is created by different clauses or
sections of this code, the prosecuting attorney may elect under
which to proceed; but not more than one recovery shall be had
against the same person for the same offense; provided, that the
revocation of a license or permit shall not be considered a recovery
or penalty so as to bar any other penalty being enforced.

(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)
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1-4A-6

1-4A-4:

APPLICABILITY OF STATE LAW:

A.

Utah Code Of Criminal Procedure: Except as otherwise provided in
this article, the procedure in all criminal cases arising under this
article shall be as prescribed in Utah Code Annotated title 77, Utah
code of criminal procedure, which is hereby incorporated and
adopted herein by reference. Any other applicable rules adopted by
the Utah supreme court also are hereby incorporated and adopted
herein by reference.

B.

Utah Criminal Code: Utah Code Annotated title 76, the Utah criminal
code, chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4, relating to principles of construction,
jurisdiction, venue, limitations of actions, multiple prosecutions,
double jeopardy, burdens of proof, definitions, principles of criminal
responsibility, punishments, and inchoate offenses apply to any
criminal offense defined in this code, except as otherwise impractical
or inappropriate in view of the context of purposes or penalties
provided.

C.

Arrest And Summons: Except as otherwise provided in this article, all
arrests of persons for any violation of this code shall be made in
accordance with Utah Code Annotated title 77, chapter 7, Utah code
of criminal procedures, and rules 6 and 7, Utah rules of criminal
procedures. All summons in lieu of warrants of arrest shall be in
accordance with rule 6, Utah rules of criminal procedures.

(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4A-5:

PROSECUTIONS:

A.

All prosecutions for violations of this code shall be in the name of
Ogden City.

B.

Prosecutions for violations of this code shall be commenced by the
filing of an information with any court having jurisdiction.

(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4A-6:

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION TO REDUCE PENALTY:

The prosecutor shall have the authority to reduce the penalty
of an offense under the provisions of this code if the reduction in the
penalty will serve the interests of justice. In making such a determination,
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the prosecutor may consider the nature of the alleged offense, the
circumstances under which the allegations arose and the resources being
brought to bear in the prosecution of the offense.
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)
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1-4B-1

1-4B-2
CHAPTER 4
CODE VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
ARTICLE B. ADMINISTRATIVE IMPOSITION
OF CIVIL PENALTIES

SECTION:
1-4B- 1
1-4B- 2
1-4B- 3
1-4B- 4
1-4B- 5
1-4B- 6
1-4B- 7
1-4B- 8
1-4B- 9
1-4B-10
1-4B-11
1-4B-12

Purpose; Applicability Of Article
Definitions
Notice Of Violation
Failure To Comply
Daily Violations
Reoccurring Violations
Multiple Violations
Payment
Extensions Of Time
Appeals
Collection
Collection Action Not Relief Of Correction Responsibility

1-4B-1:

PURPOSE; APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE: The purpose of
this article is to provide a standardized procedure for the
administrative imposition of certain civil penalties authorized under various
sections, articles, chapters or titles of this code and to encourage the
correction of code violation without resort to the criminal courts.
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)
1-4B-2:

DEFINITIONS: The following terms shall be defined as
indicated for the purposes of this article:

CIVIL CITATION (Also
Known As A
CITATION):

A written notice, issued by an enforcement
officer to a responsible party, that a violation of
this code has occurred and that a civil penalty
has been assessed.
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DATE OF NOTICE:

A. The date of personal delivery of any notice or
civil citation to the responsible party; or
B. Five (5) days after any notice or civil citation
is mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to
the:
1. Owner of the real property that is the
subject of the notice or citation at the last
known address as shown on the records of the
Weber County assessor, as evidenced in the
records maintained in the Weber County
recorder's office,
2. Occupant of the real property that is the
subject of the notice or citation at the address of
the property in violation, unless another address
for such occupant is shown on the records of
the Weber County assessor's office, as
evidenced in the records maintained in the
Weber County recorder's office; or
C. The date that a notice or civil citation is
affixed to a vehicle found in violation or mailed
via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the
registered owner of such vehicle at the address
as shown in the registration records of the state
of Utah.

ENFORCEMENT
OFFICER:

An officer, employee or other person authorized
to issue any notice of violation or civil citation.

HEARING OFFICER:

The mayor, or any hearing officer designated by
the mayor.

NOTICE OF
VIOLATION (Also
Known As A
NOTICE, NOTICE O F
C O D E VIOLATION,
NOTICE AND ORDER
OR WARNING NOTICE):

A written notice, issued by an enforcement
officer to a responsible party, that a violation of
this code has occurred.

PERSONAL DELIVERY:

Hand delivery to the responsible party, or
leaving it at the responsible party's dwelling
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house or usual place of abode with some
person of suitable age and discretion then
residing therein.
RESPONSIBLE PARTY:

Any person liable for a violation or civil penalty
under the applicable provisions of this code.

WARNING PERIOD:

Ten (10) days after the date of notice, unless a
greater period of time is given by the enforcement officer. If the notice of violation is
delivered by first class mail, the time for
correction listed in such notice shall include the
additional five (5) days required for delivery.

(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4B-3:

NOTICE OF VIOLATION: If an enforcement officer finds that
a violation exists within the city, the enforcement officer may
provide a notice of violation to the responsible party. The notice of violation
shall indicate the nature of the violation, the action necessary to correct it,
the warning period established before imposition of civil penalties, and the
civil penalty amount for failure to correct the violation within the established
warning period. The date of notice applicable to such notice shall serve to
start the warning period.
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4B-4:

FAILURE T O C O M P L Y : If a violation within the city remains
uncorrected after expiration of the warning period, the
responsible party shall be liable for the civil penalties imposed under such
title, chapter, article or section of this code. Such penalty shall be assessed
by issuance of a citation by the enforcement officer. Any penalty assessed
herein shall be in addition to such other penalties as may be provided in
this code.
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4B-5:

DAILY VIOLATIONS: Each day a violation remains
uncorrected after expiration of the warning period and upon
any subsequent issuance of a civil citation shall give rise to a separate civil
penalty. The city may combine any action to recover daily penalties with
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any other civil penalty regarding the same property or person. No civil
citation shall issue for a daily violation that occurs in conjunction with
another criminal violation as part of a single criminal episode that will be
prosecuted in a criminal proceeding.
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4B-6:

REOCCURRING VIOLATIONS: If a violation is corrected but
reoccurs on or related to the same property within two (2)
years following the imposition of any civil penalty and the violation is
committed by the same person, any subsequent violation after expiration of
a new warning period shall subject that person to the applicable maximum
penalty.
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4B-7:

M U L T I P L E VIOLATIONS: If a notice of violation describes
more than one violation on or related to the same property,
only the highest civil penalty shall be applicable for the daily violations.
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4B-8:

P A Y M E N T : Any person issued a civil citation shall within
twenty (20) days of the date of notice pay the civil penalty,
unless a written request for a hearing is filed pursuant to section 1-4B-10 of
this article.
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4B-9:
A.

EXTENSIONS OF TIME:

Upon receipt of a written application from any person who may be
subject to future civil penalties under the provisions of this article
and by agreement of such person to comply with the notice if
allowed additional time, the enforcement officer may grant an
extended warning period, if the officer determines that good cause
exists for such extended warning period and the extension will not
seriously threaten the effective enforcement of the applicable title,
chapter, article or section of this code, nor pose an imminent danger
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to the public health, safety or welfare. The mayor may adopt written
guidelines for the granting of extensions under this section.
B.

The granting of an extension shall not restrict the power of the
building official to require vacation of premises, nor restrict the
enforcement of other code violations.

(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4B-10:

APPEALS:

A.

Request; Application: Any person having received a notice of
violation or a civil citation may request a hearing before a hearing
officer by filing a written application for a hearing in the city
recorder's office within ten (10) days of the date of notice. Hearings
shall be conducted as provided in title 4, chapter 4, article A of this
code. All applications for hearing shall be accompanied by a copy of
the notice of violation and the fee established in section 4-6-1 of this
code.

B.

Notification Of Enforcement Officer: Upon receipt of an application
for hearing, the city recorder shall immediately notify the
enforcement officer.

C.

Burden Of Proof: The burden to prove any defense shall be upon the
person raising such defense.

D.

Applicable Defenses: The hearing officer may dismiss the notice and
release the person from liability, if any of the following defenses are
applicable:
1. Notice was not served in compliance with the provisions of this
article;
2. The violation was corrected within the warning period;
3. It is determined that no violation of the ordinance existed under
the notice or civil citation; or
4. At the time of the notice or civil citation, compliance would have
violated the criminal laws of the state.

E.

Mitigating Circumstances: If the hearing officer finds that a violation
did occur but that mitigating circumstances exist, the penalty may be
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reduced after the violation is corrected. Mitigating circumstances
may include:
1. If a change in the actual ownership of the subject property was
recorded with the county recorder's office after the notice of violation
was issued and the new owner is not related by blood, marriage or
common ownership to the prior owner;
2. If the violation or inability to cure were caused by a force majeure
event such as war, act of nature, strike or civil disturbance;
3. Compliance with the notice would have presented an imminent
and irreparable injury to persons or property; or
4. Such other mitigating circumstances as may be approved by the
city attorney or the responsible official.
F.

Correction After Expiration Of Warning Period Not Defense: It shall
not be a defense that the responsible party corrected the violation
after expiration of the warning period.

G.

Agreement For Delayed Or Periodic Payments: If the hearing officer
finds that the violation occurred and no applicable defense applies,
the hearing officer may, in the interest of justice and on behalf of the
city, enter into an agreement for the delayed or periodic payment of
the applicable penalties. In the absence of an agreement for delayed
or periodic payments, any civil penalty upheld or reduced by the
hearing officer shall be paid within twenty (20) days of the date of
the hearing officer's written decision.

H.

Appeal To Board Of Building And Fire Code Appeals Or Board Of
Zoning Adjustment: Any administrative determination by the hearing
officer regarding an interpretation of the provisions of this code
within the jurisdiction of either the board of building and fire code
appeals or the board of zoning adjustment may be appealed to the
applicable board.

I.

Appeal To District Court: Any person adversely affected by the
decision of the hearing officer may petition the district court for
review of the administrative determination pursuant to section
10-3-703.7(5), Utah Code Annotated, or its successor provision.

(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)
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1-4B-11:

COLLECTION: If a civil penalty imposed pursuant to this
article remains unpaid, the city may use such lawful means as
are available to collect such penalty, including costs and attorney fees.
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)

1-4B-12:

C O L L E C T I O N ACTION NOT RELIEF O F CORRECTION
RESPONSIBILITY: Commencement of any collection action
shall not relieve the responsibility of any person to cure any violation, if still
uncorrected.
(Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)
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12-4-1
CHAPTER 4
PROPERTY MAINTENANCE REGULATIONS

SECTION:
12-4-1:
12-4-2:
12-4-3:
12-4-4:
12-4-5:
12-4-6:
12-4-7:
12-4-8:

12-4-1:

Property Maintenance Responsibilities; Sidewalks, Park Strips
And Abutter's Alleys
Waste Materials Or Junk; Prohibited On Premises
Weed Control
Noxious Weeds
Vegetation Interfering With Public Ways Or Property
Empty Buildings To Be Kept Secured
Inspectors Authorized To Enforce Chapter
Penalties And Remedies For Violations

PROPERTY MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES; SIDEWALKS, PARK STRIPS AND ABUTTER'S ALLEYS:

A.

It shall be the duty of the owner, agent, occupant or lessee of real
property to keep their exterior property free of conditions which
violate the provisions of this chapter.

B.

It shall be the duty of the owner, agent, occupant or lessee of real
property abutting and bordering on any public street in the city to
keep the area between their property line and the curb or edge of the
roadway free of conditions which violate the provisions of this
chapter. Such area shall include sidewalks, park strips between
streets and sidewalks, or other adjacent landscaped or open areas
within a dedicated public right of way.

C.

It shall be the duty of the owner, agent, occupant or lessee of real
property which faces on an abutter's alley to keep that portion of the
alley which is adjacent to such property, free of conditions which
violate the provisions of this chapter. If the alley was dedicated for
the benefit of real property on both sides of the alley, the duty shall
extend to the centerline of the alley. If the alley was dedicated only
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for the benefit of real property along one side of the alley, the duty
shall extend for the entire width.
(1979 Code § 8.26.010; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997)

12-4-2:
A.

WASTE MATERIALS OR JUNK; PROHIBITED ON PREMISES:

Prohibition: It is unlawful for any owner, occupant, agent or lessee of
real property within the city, to allow, cause or permit the following
material or objects to be in or upon any yard, garden, lawn, or
outdoor premises of such property:
1. Junk or salvage material;
2. Litter;
3. Any abandoned vehicle or inoperable vehicle.

B.

Exceptions: The prohibition in subsection A of this section shall not
apply to:
1. Materials or objects used, kept or maintained in connection with a
business enterprise lawfully situated and licensed for the same and
operating in conformance with the zoning title or other provisions of
this code; or
2. The outdoor storage of no more than one vehicle at a residence,
as described in subsection G in the definition of "junk or salvage
yard", section 15-2-11 of this code.

C.

Prohibition On Park Strips, Sidewalks, Etc.: It is unlawful for any
owner, occupant, agent or lessee of real property abutting and
bordering on any public street in the city, for the distance such real
property abuts and borders such street, to allow, cause or permit
litter, or junk or salvage material, to be in or upon the area from the
property line to the curb line of the street or edge of the roadway.

D.

Abutter's Alleys: It is unlawful for any owner, occupant, agent or
lessee of real property facing on any abutter's alley, to allow, cause
or permit litter or junk or salvage material to be in or upon that
portion of the abutter's alley for which the owner, occupant, agent or

June 2011

Ogden City
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

12-4-2

12-4-3
lessee is responsible as provided under subsection 12-4-1C of this
chapter.

(1979 Code § 8.26.020; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997; amd. 1999 Code)

12-4-3:

WEED CONTROL:

A.

Premises: It is unlawful for any owner, occupant, agent or lessee of
real property in the city to fail to maintain the height of weeds and
grasses, in the manner provided herein, on such property, or to fail
to remove from the property any cuttings from such weeds or
grasses.

B.

Park Strips: It is unlawful for any owner, occupant, agent or lessee of
real property in the city abutting and bordering on any public street,
for the distance such property abuts and borders the street, to fail to
maintain the height of weeds and grasses, in the manner provided
herein, in the area from the property line to the curb line of the
street, or to fail to remove from such area any cuttings from such
weeds or grasses.

C.

Abutter's Alleys: It is unlawful for any owner, occupant, agent or
lessee of real property in the city which faces on an abutter's alley
for the distance such property abuts and borders, to fail to maintain
the height of weeds and grasses, in the manner provided herein, in
that portion of the abutter's alley for which the owner, occupant,
agent or lessee is responsible as provided under section 12-4-1 of
this chapter.

D.

Weed Control Specifications:
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection D2 of this section,
weeds and grasses shall be maintained at a height of not more than
six inches (6") at all times, and the cuttings shall be promptly cleared
and removed from the premises; provided, however, that this
subsection shall not be applicable to any ornamental grass so long
as it is used and maintained solely, or in combination with any other
ornamental grass or grasses, as a supplement to an overall
landscaping plan and does not constitute in square footage more
than twenty percent (20%) of the property's overall landscaped area.
2. Weeds and grasses shall be maintained at a height of not more
than twelve inches (12") at all times on any of the following
properties, and the cuttings shall be promptly cleared and removed
from the premises:
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a. Areas zoned as open space zone (0-1) pursuant to title 15 of
this code;
b. Ditches, ditch rights of way or railroad rights of way; and
c. Undeveloped property
structures).

or

vacant

lots

(no

buildings or

3. Weeds which are eradicated by chemicals must be done so before
their height exceeds the height limits provided herein, or they must
be cut at a level not exceeding such height limits.
4. Weeds which are rototilled or removed by the root must be buried
under the soil or removed from the property.
5. When, in the opinion of the fire marshal, or any assistant fire
marshal, the large size or terrain of property makes the cutting of all
weeds or grasses impractical, the fire marshal, or any assistant fire
marshal, may, by written order, allow and limit the required cutting of
weeds and grasses to a firebreak of not less than fifteen feet (15') in
width cut around the complete perimeter of the property and around
any structures existing upon the property, unless the fire marshal, or
assistant fire marshal, determines that a firebreak of a lesser width
will provide adequate protection against fire spread at the particular
location.
6. The fire marshal may from time to time exempt from, or limit, in
whole or in part, the required cutting of weeds and grasses for
property established and maintained as a nature park or wetland
mitigation area, if the fire marshal, or assistant fire marshal,
determines that such limitation or exemption will not present a
potential fire hazard to adjacent properties.
(1979 Code §8.26.030; Ord. 97-91,
12-17-2002)

12-16-1997; amd. Ord. 2002-73,

12-4-4:

NOXIOUS WEEDS: It shall be unlawful for the owner or
occupant of any real property to allow to grow on such
property any noxious weeds or other noxious vegetable growth determined
by the county health department to be especially injurious to public health,
crops, livestock, land, or other property.
(1979 Code § 8.26.040; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997)
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12-4-5:

VEGETATION INTERFERING WITH PUBLIC WAYS OR
PROPERTY: It shall be unlawful for the owner or occupant of
any real property to allow vegetation on the owner's or occupant's real
property to grow to such an extent or in such a manner that, because of its
proximity to public property or a public right of way, it interferes with the
safe or lawful use of public property or the public right of way, or obstructs
the vision of any posted uniform traffic control device.
(1979 Code § 8.26.050; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997)

12-4-6:

E M P T Y BUILDINGS T O B E K E P T SECURED: It shall be
unlawful for the owners or agents or persons in charge of
unoccupied buildings or structures within the city to fail to keep such
buildings and structures closed and securely locked or otherwise secured
against entry.
(1979 Code § 8.26.060; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997)

12-4-7:

INSPECTORS AUTHORIZED TO ENFORCE CHAPTER:

A.

Appointment By Mayor: The mayor shall appoint inspectors who are
authorized to enforce the provisions of this chapter.

B.

Powers And Duties:
1. An inspector is authorized and directed to inspect and examine
real property situated within the city for the purpose of determining
whether or not a property maintenance violation exists.
2. All matters involving health shall be pursued in coordination with
the county health department. All matters involving weeds or other
fire hazards shall be pursued in coordination with the fire
department. All matters involving the boarding of dangerous
buildings shall be pursued in coordination with the building official.
All matters involving the lawful use of land under the zoning title
shall be pursued in coordination with the community and economic
development director, or the director's designee.
3. The mayor may assign primary responsibility in those areas of
overlapping jurisdiction.
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(1979 Code §8.26.080; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997; amd. Ord. 2001-32,
6-5-2001; Ord. 2004-39, 6-15-2004, eff. 7-1-2004)

12-4-8:

PENALTIES AND REMEDIES FOR VIOLATIONS:

A.

Misdemeanor: Owners, agents, occupants or lessees who violate the
provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor
and upon conviction shall be punishable as set forth in title 1,
chapter 4, article A of this code.

B.

City Abatement And Associated Civil Penalties: Litter or other
unlawful accumulations or conditions not removed from private
property, or adjacent sidewalks, park strips, alleys, or other adjacent
areas for which the person is responsible under the provisions of this
chapter, may be removed by the city pursuant to the provisions of
chapter 8 of this title, or its successor, with costs and expenses for
such cleaning or removal and civil penalties to be assessed in
accordance with the provisions of such chapter.

C.

Civil Penalties: Owners, agents, occupants or lessees who fail to
correct a violation of the provisions of this chapter after notice of
violation and expiration of the warning period shall be subject to the
following civil penalties pursuant to title 1, chapter 4, article B of this
code:
1. The first civil citation issued after expiration of the warning period
shall subject the responsible party to the initial penalty of one
hundred twenty five dollars ($125.00).
2. The second civil citation issued after expiration of the warning
period and the prior imposition of the initial penalty shall subject the
responsible party to the intermediate penalty of two hundred fifty
dollars ($250.00).
3. Any subsequent civil citation issued after expiration of the warning
period and the prior imposition of the intermediate penalty, or any
reoccurring violation under section 1-4B-6 of this code, shall subject
the responsible party to the maximum penalty of five hundred dollars
($500.00).

D.

Other Remedies: This chapter may also be enforced by injunction,
mandamus, judicial abatement or any other appropriate action in law
or equity.
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E.

Daily Violations: Each day that any violation of this chapter continues
shall be considered a separate offense for purposes of the penalties
and remedies available to the city.

F.

Compliance: Accumulation of penalties for violations, but not the
obligation for payment of penalties already accrued, shall stop on
correction of the violation.

G.

Cumulative: Any one, all, or any combination of the foregoing
penalties and remedies may be used to enforce the provisions of this
title.

(1979 Code §8.26.070; Ord. 97-91, 12-16-1997; amd. Ord. 2002-73,
12-17-2002; Ord. 2005-29, 5-24-2005)
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